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DICTIONARIES FAIL: THE VOLCKER RULE’S RELIANCE ON 
DEFINITIONS RENDERS IT INEFFECTIVE AND A NEW 
SOLUTION IS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY REGULATE 
PROPRIETARY TRADING. 
 
R. Rex Chatterjee 
 
Abstract 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, Congress enacted 
legislation to regulate the proprietary trading activities of Wall Street 
banks. The Volcker Rule, passed into law as section 619 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, bans proprietary trading for deposit-taking banks and bank-
holding companies with deposit-taking subsidiaries or affiliates. It 
nevertheless allows these institutions to continue to trade on behalf of 
customers, a category of transactions necessary for the healthy 
functioning of both the U.S. and global financial systems. The Rule 
proposes that regulators devise rules to distinguish between permissible, 
often client-facing trades, and impermissible proprietary trades. The rules 
rely on definitions and metrics to form bright-line distinctions. The thesis 
of this article is that such a system is doomed to fail because of inherent 
methodological flaws. 
This article analyzes the regulation of banking entities under the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in order to demonstrate the successful 
implementation of a structure-based regulatory regime that separated 
investment banks from commercial banks. As a result, proprietary 
trading activities were structurally insulated from institutional access to 
the Federal Reserve Bank’s Discount Window. This article 
acknowledges the argument that a return to a Glass-Steagall-style 
regulatory regime is infeasible following the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which gave rise to modern financial 
institutions. This explains why the Volcker Rule focuses on transactions 
instead of structure.  
This article concludes by proposing an alternative regulatory plan 
that would sidestep the problem-laden task of attempting to distinguish 
proprietary from non-proprietary trading on a bright-line basis; instead, 
the proposed regime would focus on regulating all sales and trading 
activities together on a structural level. The plan would cleave trading 
operations from the banking entities’ structures by separating them into 
subsidiary entities with independent capitalization and ownership. This 
plan is engineered to isolate traders from the moral hazards created by 
institutional access to the Federal Reserve Discount Window. 
Furthermore, it would shackle the continuance of their client-serving 
operations to the risks taken in their proprietary books.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This article analyzes issues arising from the proposed 
implementation of Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the 
Volcker Rule. First proposed by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Bank, the Rule tightly restricts the ability of banking 
entities to engage in certain financial activities, namely, proprietary 
trading, investing in hedge funds,and investing in private equity funds. 
Congress targeted these activities because of their high potential for 
creating substantial financial risk, on both a firm and system-wide level. 
The Rule specifically targets banking entities with access to the Federal 
Reserve Bank’s Discount Window1 because the availability of “cheap” 
federal funds can yield a greater tolerance for risk at the expense of the 
U.S. taxpayer. Ultimately, this creates a moral hazard problem. This 
article focuses on the inefficiency of the Volcker Rule in regulating 
banking activity, specifically in terms of prohibiting proprietary trading. 
Part II of this article provides a concise discourse on the ways in 
which financial reform legislation after the crash of 1929 focused on the 
securities dealing and investment banking activities of commercial 
banks. It analyzes the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which banned 
commercial banks from engaging in securities dealing, and the effect of 
its eventual repeal through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The 
legislation process for the Dodd-Frank Act originated as a reaction to a 
major financial crisis in the United States. In this way, it is similar to the 
process which yielded the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Glass-Steagall 
isolated the business of commercial banking from that of investment 
banking on an institutional level. The recombination of these business 
lines within modern financial institutions, as permitted by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, gave rise to certain perverse incentives which the Volcker 
Rule has been designed to address. Part II then proceeds to explain why a 
return to Glass-Steagall-style regulation of the financial industry would 
be impractical in the present situation because of developments in the 
structures of financial institutions since 1999. The section concludes with 
the notion that the Volcker Rule effectuates the same principles of 
financial regulation as Glass-Steagall without its burdensome restrictions 
on the structure of financial institutions.  
Part III begins with an exploration of exactly what proprietary 
trading is. The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited US depository institutions 
from engaging in proprietary trading. Proprietary trading is regarded as 
                                                     
1 The Discount Window, as it is referred to here, is a credit facility operated by the US Federal 
Reserve Bank to allow financial institutions to borrow money from the Federal Reserve in order to 
cover a liquidity shortage. The loans are generally made on a secured basis and are made at the 
“discount rate.” For the purposes of this article, it is important to understand simply that financial 
institutions with access to the Discount Window have access to federal government money at a very 
low interest rate. For further reading, see generally Discount Window,WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discount_window (last modified Sept. 14, 2011, 10:11 AM). See also, 
Discount Window, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountwindow.asp (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
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one of the many causes of financial instability which gave rise to the 
system-wide crash and subsequent recession. The section then proceeds 
to highlight certain instances where proprietary trading caused significant 
instability within major US financial institutions. It concludes with a 
discussion of public sentiment in reaction to proprietary trading. 
Part IV of this article focuses on the interconnections between 
proprietary trading and so-called “permitted banking activities.” Despite 
the harm that proprietary trading caused during the crisis of 2008-2009, it 
would cripple financial markets worldwide if all proprietary trading were 
made illegal in one fell swoop of the legislative pen. The Volcker Rule 
includes a carve-out provision to maintain the legality of certain 
proprietary trading activities. These activities are necessary to maintain 
adequate liquidity in financial markets, support access to capital markets 
through underwriting, and to pursue other legitimate business purposes. 
However, at the margins, it becomes difficult to distinguish proprietary 
trading from many of the permitted banking activities. Significant issues 
arise in attempting to distinguish one set from the other. Proprietary 
trading is defined in Part III. Part IV discusses the set of permitted 
activities, and then proceeds to discuss how banking entities may seek to 
disguise proprietary trading activities as permitted activities in order to 
evade the Volcker Rule. 
Part V of this article discusses different potential definitions of a set 
of key terms which set the boundary between proprietary trading and 
permissible banking activities. It will be necessary for a regulatory 
system to precisely and predictably distinguish the two. Overly broad 
definitions will negatively impact capital market liquidity as well as 
myriad types of financial transactions worldwide. Overly narrow 
definitions will render the statute meaningless and will do little to 
prevent a future crisis. Imprecise definitions will lead to a cat-and-mouse 
game between banking entities and regulators. The statute, as written, 
leaves much discretion to US financial regulatory agencies.  
Part VI concludes that the Volcker Rule will be ineffective in its 
mission of prohibiting harmful proprietary trading. Furthermore, the 
section hypothesizes that regulatory regime that will be created to 
enforce the rule will be overwhelmed by largely unnecessary tasks and 
that agencies will be beset by litigation over the definition of the key 
terms highlighted above.  
Part VII, an epilogue to this article’s analysis of the Volcker Rule, 
suggests an alternative regime for the regulation of proprietary trading. 
The alternative regime utilizes bankruptcy-remoteness and the 
partnership model as two techniques to align managerial incentives with 
an amount of risk-aversion necessary for the ongoing health of the global 
financial system. The section provides a skeleton-level outline of the 
regime and notes where future study will be necessary to develop it. It 
analyzes potential ramifications of the proposed regime and discusses 
barriers to its implementation. 
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II.    GLASS-STEAGALL, GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY, AND THE ROAD TO THE 
2008 CRISIS 
A. The Role of Proprietary Trading in Shaping the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 
The stock market crash of 1929 triggered upwards of 11,000 
commercial bank failures between the years 1930 and 1933.
2
 In response 
to the catastrophic event, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, also 
known as the Banking Act of 1933
3
 The congressional hearings on the 
bill examined the causes of the crash and identified specific banking 
practices that led to instability within the financial system.
4
 Many of the 
identified practices were proprietary in nature, particularly banks’ 
practice of underwriting transactions and investments in securities.
5
 
Members of Congress viewed these activities with skepticism because 
the activities subjected commercial bankers—entrusted to give 
depositors sound and impartial investment advice—to the pecuniary 
financial incentives of investment bankers and securities dealers, who 
generate profits by underwriting, sales, trading, and distribution of 
securities.
6
 Congressmen were of the opinion that as the securities 
businesses of banks grew larger, the pecuniary incentives became more 
powerful and increasingly destabilized the US financial system, partially 
causing the 1929 crash.
7
 
In 1932, Congress formed the Pecora Commission to investigate 
banking practices in the years leading up to 1929 crash.
8
 The 
Commission published its findings in 1934 and largely confirmed 
Congress’s proposed ‘factors’ that gave rise to the 1929 crash, including 
proprietary trading.
9
 For example, the Commission found that investment 
banks’ incentives conflicted with the fiduciary duties owed to 
                                                     
2 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., § 96.02 Separation of Investment and Commercial Bank 
Services, in BANKING LAW 1 (2010).  
3 Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994). 
4 See generally Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A 
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971).  
5 S. REP. NO. 73-77 (1933). 
6 See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9875, 9912 (1932) (remarks of Senator Bulkley) (The banker ought 
to be regarded as the financial confidant and mentor of his depositors. . . .Obviously, the banker who 
has nothing to sell to his depositors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly and to regard 
diligently the safety of depositors than the banker who uses the list of depositors in his savings 
department to distribute circulars concerning the advantages of this, that, or the other investment on 
which the bank is to receive an originating profit or an underwriting profit or a distribution profit or 
a trading profit or any combination of such profits.). 
7 See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932) (statement of Senator Walcott) (“Most of the banks had 
been engaged in underwriting, and still are. The security business became such an important part of 
the operations of some of the banks, particularly of two or three of our larger banks, that some fear 
was occasioned that they would get away from the strictly commercial business for which they were 
organized and put out securities of doubtful value. At any rate, there was a conflict of opinion; there 
was a conflict between the business of marketing securities and the business of protecting 
depositors’ money.”). 
8 See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT 
BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990).  
9 See generally S. REP. NO. 73-1455 (1934). 
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commercial bank depositors.
10
 The report stated that if a bank can act as 
both a dealer and as a customer agent on the same transaction, then it has 
an inherent conflict of interest.
11
 These findings further substantiated 
Congress’s opinion that as banks increased their involvement in 
securities trading, their pecuniary incentives became more powerful, 
resulting in behavior that destabilized the U.S. financial system and 
partially caused the 1929 crash.
12
 
 
B. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Effect of its Repeal Through 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
The securities activities of commercial banks led to the enactment of 
the Glass-Steagall Act. Glass-Steagall cleaved investment banking from 
commercial banking, thus curbing the ability of commercial banks to 
engage in securities dealing (i.e., trading securities for their own 
accounts).
13
 Glass-Steagall also prohibited securities underwriters from 
taking deposits
14
 and it likewise prevented member banks from affiliating 
with companies that primarily engaged in underwriting or securities 
dealing.
15
 Commercial banks had to cease their securities dealing 
activities. Many banks chose to spin off their investment banking and 
securities businesses into separate firms. For example, J.P. Morgan & 
Co. split into two entities: a commercial bank keeping the name J.P. 
Morgan & Co. and an investment bank called Morgan 
Stanley.
16
Although commercial banks eventually expanded their ability 
to underwrite securities even under the Glass-Steagall Act’s 
regulations,
17
 it strictly prohibited banks from engaging in proprietary 
trading. 
                                                     
10 Id. at 87. 
11 Id. at 20 (“The New York Stock Exchange has adopted a rule prohibiting a member, when 
acting as a broker, from buying or selling for his own account or that of a partner or for any account 
in which he or a partner is interested, securities, the order for the sale or purchase of which has been 
accepted by him or his firm or a partner for execution, except under the conditions specified in the 
rule. However assiduous the exchange authorities may be in protecting the rights of the customer, 
the conflict between the broker’s self-interest and his duty to his customer is present, and the 
customer’s welfare is thereby endangered.”). 
12 See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932) (statement of Senator Walcott) (“Most of the banks 
had been engaged in underwriting, and still are. The security business became such an important part 
of the operations of some of the banks, particularly of two or three of our larger banks, that some 
fear was occasioned that they would get away from the strictly commercial business for which they 
were organized and put out securities of doubtful value. At any rate, there was a conflict of opinion; 
there was a conflict between the business of marketing securities and the business of protecting 
depositors’ money.”).  
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16
 RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE 
OF MODERN FINANCE (2001). 
17 Id. (“In the 1980s, commercial banks began trying to push back on Glass-Steagall’s 
prohibition on securities underwriting. They started with commercial paper, but quickly moved on to 
corporate debt securities. In 1989, the Fed permitted J.P. Morgan to underwrite a bond offering by 
the Xerox Corporation. This was the first time since the institution of Glass-Steagall that a 
commercial bank was allowed to underwrite corporate debt.”). 
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The 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, effectively reversed 
the changes made by the Glass-Steagall Act.
18
 It repealed Glass-
Steagall’s prohibition of commercial banks from affiliating with 
securities firms or investment banks and engaging in proprietary 
securities dealing. It also amended the Bank Holding Company Act
19
 to 
make mergers between banks, insurers, and securities firms legal under a 
holding company structure.
20
 
Nine years after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall restrictions by 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the United States underwent a financial crisis 
similar in magnitude to the 1929 crash. Nobel laureate economist Paul 
Krugman has stated that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall reforms was one 
of the causes of the financial crisis of 2008.
21
 Others have joined in 
blaming Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s removal of Glass-Steagall’s restrictions 
on the trading activities of banks for the economic calamity.
22
 Without 
those restrictions, large banking entities could allow their investment 
arms to take on increased risk in their trading activities while relying on 
their commercial bank’s access to the Federal Reserve Bank’s Discount 
Window as a financial backstop.
23
 This reintroduced what economists 
call a “moral hazard” for banks24—a perverse incentive, the prevention 
of which is a main purpose of lawmaking itself.  
 
 
                                                     
18 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106–02, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); see also S. 900, 106th 
Cong. (1999).  
19 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–50 (amended 1999). 
20 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  
21 Paul Krugman, Bankers Without a Clue, NEW YORK TIMES ONLINE (Jan. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/opinion/15krugman.html. (“But the truth is that the United 
States managed to avoid major financial crises for half a century after the Pecora hearings were held 
and Congress enacted major banking reforms. It was only after we forgot those lessons, and 
dismantled effective regulation, that our financial system went back to being dangerously 
unstable.”). 
22 Damian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Ten Questions for Those Fixing the Financial Mess,THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123665023774979341.html. (“President Barack Obama argued on 
the campaign trail that one bill – the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 – led to deregulation that 
helped cause the crisis. Among other things, that law allowed for the creation of giant financial 
supermarkets that could own investment banks, commercial banks and insurance firms, something 
banned since the Great Depression. Its passage, critics say, cleared the way for companies that were 
too big and intertwined to fail.”). 
23 THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 18 (Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller eds., Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2009). 
24 Robert B. Ekelund & Mark Thornton, More Awful Truths About Republicans,LUDWIG VON 
MISES INST. (Sep. 4, 2008), http://mises.org/daily/3098. (“The Financial Services Modernization Act 
of 1999 would make perfect sense in a world regulated by a gold standard, 100% reserve banking, 
and no FDIC deposit insurance; but in the world as it is, this ‘deregulation’ amounts to corporate 
welfare for financial institutions and a moral hazard that will make taxpayers pay dearly. Such 
government privileges are nothing new to Republicans—consider the effective subsidies to the 
pharmaceutical, sugar, and steel industries—but this particular gift to financial institutions is what 
allowed the credit bubble to expand to such absurd proportions, because it allowed banks of all types 
to engage in increasingly risky transactions and to greatly expand the leverage of their balance 
sheets.”). 
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C. The Impracticalities of a Return to Glass-Steagall-style Regulation in 
2011 
Krugman argued that as Congress forgot the lessons it learned from 
the Pecora Commission, it set itself up for a replay of the 1929 crash.
25
 
He identified the need for new legislation that would prevent a future 
crash of a similar nature from occurring.
26
 If figures such as Krugman 
thought that the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed significantly to the 
2008 crash, it follows logically that they argued for a return to Glass-
Steagall-type regulation.
27
 In December 2009, Senators John McCain and 
Maria Cantwell jointly proposed to reenact the Glass-Steagall Act,
28
 but 
the bill did not pass.
29
 
A return to Glass-Steagall’s restrictions on financial 
conglomerates—e.g. combinations of commercial banking, investment 
banking, and insurance underwriting—would be problematic because it 
would force major U.S. financial institutions to dissect themselves and 
reduce their global competitiveness in order to comply. 
For example, Citicorp’s (a commercial bank) merger with Travelers 
Group (an insurer) and its subsequent acquisition of SmithBarney (a 
brokerage) was legalized by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.
30
 It 
would have to be unwound if the United States were to return to a strict 
Glass-Steagall regulatory regime. In another example, Bank of America 
acquired Merrill Lynch on September 14, 2008, after the latter’s losses 
from trading in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) threatened to 
collapse the firm.
31
 The acquisition illustrates how structural 
combinations between commercial banks and securities firms are too 
intertwined and vital in today’s financial markets to be undone. The 
acquisition gave Bank of America, a leader in the U.S. financial sector, a 
stronger competitive position worldwide.
32
 
It is important to note that the financial industry, like everything else, 
is becoming increasingly globalized as the new millennium progresses. 
Among the many consequences of globalization is increased 
international competition for business. The ability of businesses to 
                                                     
25 Id. 
26 Id. ("Sooner or later, this runaway system was bound to crash. And if we don’t make 
fundamental changes, it will happen all over again."). 
27 Paul Krugman, Glass-Steagal, Part Deux, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/glass-steagal-part-deux. 
28 Press Release of Senator Cantwell (Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=320823. 
29 Banking Integrity Act, S. 2886, 111th Cong. (2009) (referred to S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, Dec. 16, 2009, no further action taken.); see also Glass-Steagall 
Restoration Act, H.R. 4375, 111th Cong. (2009) (referred to H. Comm. on Financial Services, Dec. 
16, 2009, no further action taken).  
30 See generallyLissa Lamkin Broome & Jerry W. Markham, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: 
An Overview (2001), available at http://www.symtrex.com/pdfdocs/glb_paper.pdf. 
31 Matthew Karnitsching, Carrick Mollenkamp, & Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank of America to Buy 
Merrill,WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2008), at A1. 
32 Id. (“Merrill could give Bank of America strength around the world, including emerging 
markets such as India. And Merrill is also strong in underwriting, an area Bank of America identified 
last week at an investors’ conference where it would like to be more aggressive.”). 
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relocate across jurisdictions creates some level of international regulatory 
competition to attract business. The nation with the most robust presence 
of banks will find that its corporations have cheaper access to capital 
than nations where the banking sector is weaker. Therefore, shifts in a 
nation’s banking law affect all businesses, not just the banking 
businesses. In this light, it is easy to see why maintaining and increasing 
the strength of the U.S. economy requires a robust U.S. corporate sector, 
and thus a robust U.S. banking sector. The U.S. government does not 
want banks to flee the U.S. for England, the EU, or Asia. From the U.S.’s 
standpoint, therefore, it is imperative that U.S. legislation not 
disadvantage U.S. banks compared to their European and Asian 
counterparts, because then business would flow from the former to the 
latter.
33
 
Returning to a Glass-Steagall-style regulation would have substantial 
negative effects on the banking industry. For example, if Congress were 
to reenact Glass-Steagall through the proposed (but defeated) Banking 
Integrity Act of 2009, Bank of America would be forced to sell the 
brokerage unit of Merrill Lynch,which it bought through a government-
orchestrated sale.
34
 This would have three major consequences. The first 
is intuitive: Bank of America would lose a huge advantage it gained over 
other U.S. and (more importantly) foreign financial institutions—the 
acquisition of a powerful brokerage business. Second, it would force the 
sale in a recessionary period, which could lead to systemic effects and 
further hurt a troubled global financial system.
35
 Third, it would make the 
U.S. government look foolish because the government had just finished 
engineering not only the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, but 
also the sale of Bear Stearns to J. P. Morgan, and others. Returning to 
Glass-Steagall would illegalize those combinations and force their 
undoing.
36
 
                                                     
33 It may be said that this point imputes a "protectionist" or "neomercantilist" agenda to the 
U.S. government in its regulatory treatment of U.S. banks. The U.S. government is doing nothing, 
however, to affect the regulatory regimes to which U.S.-based banks are subjected in their operations 
in foreign nations, nor is it discriminating against foreign banks in their regulatory treatment in the 
U.S. (compared with the domestic regulatory treatment of U.S. banks). Rather than protecting U.S. 
banks against competition from foreign banks, the U.S. is trying to provide a total package 
(regulatory regime being just one component of what an international bank considers in choosing 
where to base its business) that is competitive with. if not outrightly victorious over, the packages 
offered by other nations. The U.S. is not trying to help its own banks compete against foreign banks; 
the U.S. itself is competing as a nation against foreign nations for the home-basing and business of 
international banks.  
34 See Cyrus Sanati, Yearning for Glass-Steagall on Capitol Hill,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 
22, 2010, 3:17 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/yearning-for-glass-steagall-on-capitol-
hill ("Under the Volcker Rule, for example, Bank of America would still be able to keep Merrill 
Lynch’s brokerage services and investment banking units. But if Glass-Steagall were to return, Bank 
of America would need to sell virtually all of Merrill Lynch and return to being just a retail bank.”). 
35 Id. (“‘I think introducing Glass-Steagall now across the board in a weak economy would be 
counterproductive because you would force sales and the like,’’ said Representative Barney Frank of 
Massachusetts, the Democratic chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and a supporter 
of the president’’s plan."). 
36 Id. (“That major change is too much for some lawmakers to swallow, especially after the 
government helped orchestrate Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch in the first place in 
2009 — not to mention JPMorgan Chase’s takeover of Bear Stearns earlier in the year.”). 
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While it seems that Congress was focused on re-regulating the 
financial industry in the same vein as Glass-Steagall, for the 
aforementioned reasons, it is also apparent that a purely structure-based 
regulatory regime—one which focuses on the structure of financial 
institutions as commercial banks, investment banks, insurers, etc.—
would not be feasible in 2011.
37
 The Obama administration felt that the 
system had grown too structurally complex and that broad structural 
regulation unilaterally undertaken by the U.S. government would be 
ignorant of many of the positive developments and unchangeable 
realities of the modern global financial system.
38
 The government opted 
instead for stronger capital requirements under the Basel III international 
banking standard,
39
 hoping to create a larger equity cushion for banks, 
and hoping for the Volcker Rule to eliminate the pernicious conflicts of 
interest that Glass-Steagall had sought to eradicate.
40
 
 
D. The Volcker Rule as an Implementation of Glass-Steagall Regulation 
Principles 
The Volcker Rule, codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1851, has regulatory 
ambitions very similar to the Glass-Steagall Act. The Volcker Rule 
proceeds not on a structural basis (saying what commercial banks can or 
cannot own) but rather on an “activities” basis (saying what commercial 
banks can or cannot do). The Volcker Rule’’s proprietary trading 
provisions seek to limit the types of trades that so-called “banking 
entities” are able to make for their own accounts in an effort to prevent 
these institutions from relying on the federal backstop
41
 and using 
depositor money to make proprietary financial bets.
42
 Moreover, 
taxpayers do not want to be responsible for the bailout of a financial 
institution that has brought itself to financial calamity because of 
proprietary trading activities, whether undertaken with the traders’ 
reliance on the federal backstop (and thus exposure to the moral hazard) 
                                                     
37 See supra text accompanying notes 31-44. 
38 Michael Hirsh, An Odd Post-Crash Couple, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/14/an-odd-post-crash-couple.html. 
Obama administration officials have dismissed the idea that the financial sector should or can 
be changed in more fundamental ways than they are now proposing. You can’t turn back the clock, 
they say...’I think going back to Glass-Steagall would be like going back to the Walkman,’ says one 
senior Treasury official. 
Reinstituting Glass-Steagall would be almost akin to unscrambling an egg. By the time it was 
formally repealed in 1999, commercial banks like Citigroup had been moving gradually into 
investment banking for nearly two decades. Glass-Steagall had come under continual pressure as 
traditional commercial banks sought to follow their old clients into the capital markets, issuing 
stocks and bonds instead of borrowing the old way. Innovators like JPMorgan had gone global while 
the law still reigned at home, becoming big in the Euromarkets. Id. 
39 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (Dec. 2010, revised June 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [hereinafter Basel III]. 
40 Id. 
41 This federal backstop is another term for the “Discount Window” the Federal Reserve makes 
available to banks for inexpensive intraday loans. See supra note 1. 
42 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) et. seq. 
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or not. Taxpayers would be responsible for financial contribution to the 
banking entities, however, through the U.S. government’s commitments 
under the FDIC. 
While Glass-Steagall focused on the structure of banks and 
prohibited combinations of commercial banks with investment banks or 
insurance companies (among other types of financial institutions), the 
Volcker Rule proceeds by limiting the activities of “banking entities.” 
This begs the question of what exactly is a banking entity? Subsection 
(h)(1) of the Volcker Rule bases its definition of “banking entity” on the 
definition of “insured depository institution” under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.§ 1813).
43
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines “insured depository 
institution” as “any bank or savings association the deposits of which are 
insured by the Corporation pursuant to this Act [12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et 
seq.].”44 This definition conforms to the rationale stated earlier for the 
enactment of the Volcker Rule: to prohibit entities with access to deposit 
insurance from taking proprietary bets using deposits while relying on a 
federal government backstop. In this way, the Volcker Rule tracks Glass-
Steagall as a reaction to the risk-taking activities of deposit-taking banks. 
The focus on the FDIC shows that the government is concerned 
mainly with regulating risk-taking by banks to which the U.S. taxpayer 
provides protection in the event of insolvency. This includes traditional 
commercial banks with securities and brokerage businesses, such as 
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, etc. But what about 
the two major Wall Street investment firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, which were not traditionally commercial, deposit-taking 
institutions with FDIC insurance? The Volcker Rule expands upon the 
definition in § 1813 by also including institutions which control insured 
depository institutions.
45
 Because Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
became Bank Holding Companies during the financial crisis of 2008 and 
                                                     
43 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1): 
 (1) Banking entity. The term "banking entity" means any insured depository institution 
(as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813)), any company that 
controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes 
of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or subsidiary of any such 
entity. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "insured depository institution" does not include an 
institution that functions solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity, if-- 
  (A) all or substantially all of the deposits of such institution are in trust funds and are 
received in a bona fide fiduciary capacity; 
  (B) no deposits of such institution which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation are offered or marketed by or through an affiliate of such institution; 
  (C) such institution does not accept demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may 
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others or make commercial 
loans; and 
  (D) such institution does not-- 
    (i) obtain payment or payment related services from any Federal Reserve bank, 
including any service referred to in section 11A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 248a); or 
    (ii) exercise discount or borrowing privileges pursuant to section 19(b)(7) of the 
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 461(b)(7)). 
44 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2). 
45 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1). 
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now control insured depository institutions under the 12 U.S.C. § 
1813(c)(2) definition,
46
 they themselves are now within the purview of 
the Volcker Rule as “banking entities” under the 12 U.S.C § 1851(h)(1) 
definition. Goldman and Morgan were the last two “independent 
investment banks” on Wall Street before their conversion to Bank 
Holding Companies and submission to regulation by the Federal 
Reserve.
47
 After their conversion, all of Wall Street’s major players had 
access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window, which strikes many as 
somewhat of a windfall. However, because access to the Discount 
Window facility requires all of the banks to be or control insured 
depository institutions,
48
 the major banks and bank holding companies all 
fall within the Volcker Rule’s definition of a “banking entity” and are 
thus subject to its restrictions. 
However, as stated before, the U.S. government has an interest in 
enabling its banks to compete on an international scale. Doing this 
requires avoiding the imposition of restrictive regulation on domestic 
banks while allowing foreign banks unfettered access to the U.S. 
financial system. To maintain an even playing field, U.S. branches of 
foreign banks qualify as “banking entities” under the Volcker Rule and 
are subject to the same restrictions as their U.S. counterparts. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act contains a provision which reads, “The 
term ‘insured depository institution’ includes any uninsured branch or 
agency of a foreign bank or a commercial lending company owned or 
controlled by a foreign bank for the purposes of section 1818 of this title 
[12 U.S.C.S. § 1818].”49 Thus, the U.S. branches of foreign banks (such 
as UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Nomura, Mizuho, etc.) are 
banking entities under the Volcker Rule’s definition in 12 U.S.C. § 
1851(h)(1). 
In enacting the Volcker Rule, Congress seemed to have been trying 
to lasso in the same group of entities as it did when enacting the Glass-
Steagall Act. In both pieces of financial legislation, Congress sought to 
place restrictions on the activities of deposit-taking banks operating in 
the United States and whose deposits would be backstopped by the U.S. 
government. Banks with this sort of backstop would be subject to a 
moral hazard: reliance on federal insurance of their deposits could 
artificially enlarge the banks’ appetites for risk, to their own detriment 
and that of the global financial system. The Glass-Steagall Act and the 
Volcker Rule aimed to constrain, if not eliminate, the influence of this 
                                                     
46 As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008, 
9:35PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holding-
companies. ("In its statement, Goldman said that it would become the nation’s fourth-largest bank 
holding company, with its small existing deposit-taking units to be rolled into GS Bank USA. 
Morgan Stanley will convert its Utah industrial bank into a deposit-taking national bank, to be called 
Morgan Stanley Bank."). 
47 Id. ("Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two independent investment banks, will 
become bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve said Sunday night, a move that will 
fundamentally alter the landscape of Wall Street."). 
48 12 U.S.C. § 1811. 
49 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(3). 
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moral hazard. However, they went about their mission in separate ways. 
Glass-Steagall took a structural approach, as discussed.
50
 It chalked out 
categories of entities, such as commercial banks, investment banks, 
insurance companies, etc., and prevented combinations between 
commercial banks and others.
51
 The Volcker Rule does not focus on 
structure. It defines only one set of entities with which it is concerned: 
the “banking entities” discussed above. The Volcker Rule regulates the 
entities’ activities, designating as “impermissible” those activities which 
Congress suspects would give rise to a moral hazard problem for the 
banking entity.
52
 
The Volcker Rule takes a two-pronged approach in regulating the 
activities of banking entities. Its title reads, “Prohibitions on proprietary 
trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity 
funds.”53 The first prong deals with proprietary trading activities of 
banking entities and prong two focuses on the activities of banking 
entities in relation to hedge funds and private equity funds. For the sake 
of maintaining a tight focus, this article shall focus solely on the 
prohibition of proprietary trading.  
 
III.   THE ROLE OF PROPRIETARY TRADING IN THE 2008 FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
A. What is Proprietary Trading? 
The Volcker Rule defines “proprietary trading” in the following 
manner:  
 
The term “proprietary trading,” when used with respect to a banking 
entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board, means 
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity 
or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board in any 
transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, 
any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for 
future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or 
contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the 
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, 
by rule as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.
54
 
 
This definition lays the foundation for what ultimately becomes a web of 
defined terms used to circumscribe the trading activities that Congress 
wished to prohibit. It is important to unpack these terms piece by piece. 
                                                     
50 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994); see supra pp. 10-13.  
51
 Id. 
52 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (h)(4). 
53 12 U.S.C. § 1851. 
54 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). 
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The second clause of the first sentence, “when used with respect to a 
banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the 
Board,”55 states the two classes of entities for which the term 
“proprietary trading” shall be defined by the definition in 12 U.S.C. § 
1851(h)(4). For entities that are neither banking entities nor nonbank 
financial companies supervised by the Board (such as foreign banks 
doing business in foreign territories), the term proprietary trading is not 
defined under the definition in 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). Furthermore, it 
bears mentioning that while this definition of the term “proprietary 
trading” is the same with respect to nonbank financial companies 
supervised by the Board
56
 as it is to banking entities,
57
it does not mean 
that proprietary trading is prohibited for nonbank financial companies 
supervised by the Board. Banking entities cannot engage in proprietary 
trading,
58
but nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board 
can.They are merely subject to more stringent capital requirements and 
quantitative limits with regard to their proprietary trading activities.
59
 
The next important phrase is “engaging as a principal.”60Since the 
statute does not further define the term,it is necessary to look to industry 
definitions. The investment encyclopedia Investopedia defines 
“principal” with regard to trading as “[t]he main party to a transaction, 
acting as either a buyer or seller for his/her own account and risk.”61 It is 
commonly defined in opposition to the term “agent,” which Investopedia 
defines as “[a]n individual or firm that places securities transactions for 
clients.”62 With the term “engaging as a principal,” Congress is targeting 
traders who are trading on their own impetus and for their own profit, not 
to match a customer order, or “customer flow” as it is called on trading 
floors. 
The phrase which follows is “for the trading account of the banking 
entity or nonbank financial company...”63 The term “trading account” is 
further defined in the following manner: 
 
The term “trading account” means any account used for acquiring or 
taking positions in the securities and instruments described in 
paragraph (4) principally for the purpose of selling in the near term 
(or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-
term price movements), and any such other accounts as the 
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange 
                                                     
55 Id. 
56 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(3). 
57 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1). 
58 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A). 
59 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2). 
60 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). 
61 Principal, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ p/principal.asp (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2011). 
62 Agent, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ a/agent.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 
2011). 
63 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). 
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Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, 
by rule as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.
64
 
 
This definition, like the previous one, deserves some unpacking in 
order to make sense of the implications for the Volcker Rule.The heart of 
this definition is the phrase “principally for the purpose of selling in the 
near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from 
short-term price movements)...”65 First, “the near term” must be defined. 
The statute does not define it. Instead, it is presumably up to the 
regulatory bodies (i.e., the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC) to 
determine. How it is defined will significantly impact the strength of the 
Volcker Rule. 
The same goes for the phrase “profit from short-term price 
movements.”66 What is a short-term price movement? Also, what does 
“profit from” mean? An investment bought and held for five years still 
accumulates wealth with each “short term” upwards price movement 
because, if they last, these price movements become long-term price 
movements. Does “profit[ing] from” require a sale or an exercise? If so, 
is the required action different across different asset classes? How these 
terms are defined will impact the success of the Volcker Rule in policing 
the trading activities of Wall Street banks. 
Two lines of analysis emerge from the definition of trading account 
in the Volcker Rule: 1) trading account as defined by the length of 
security-holding, and 2) trading account as defined by profiting from 
short-term movement in securities. As shall be demonstrated, the finance 
world’s understanding of the term has clearly influenced the definition of 
“trading account” in the Volcker Rule. Although the two are not the 
same, it seems as though the Volcker Rule is proceeding on the same two 
lines as Wall Street in distinguishing a trading account from the other 
main type of securities account—an investment account. Investopedia 
defines “trading account” as “[a]n account held at a financial institution 
and administered by an investment dealer that the account holder uses to 
employ a trading strategy rather than a buy-and-hold investment 
strategy.”67 The focus of the industry’s definition is whether the 
investments in the account are “buy-and-hold.” A “buy-and-hold” 
investment strategy is defined by Investopedia as “[a] passive investment 
strategy in which an investor buys stocks and holds them for a long 
period of time, regardless of fluctuations in the market. An investor who 
employs a buy-and-hold strategy actively selects stocks, but once in a 
position, is not concerned with short-term price movements and technical 
indicators.”68 
                                                     
64 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Trading Account, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tradingaccount. asp 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
68 Buy and Hold, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ b/buyandhold.asp (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
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This definition turns on two factors. The first factor is temporality: 
strategies executed from an investment account involve holding a 
security for a “long period of time.”69 Trading accounts are 
distinguishable from investment accounts because they do not involve 
long-term-hold strategies. This ambiguous factor presents difficulties in 
maintaining clear distinctions between investment and trading accounts 
because there is no set length of time that divides them. The second 
factor isbinary: passive or active investing. Investment accounts are 
defined as passive investing, whereas trading accounts are those with 
which traders execute active strategies. These non-passive strategies 
involve rigorous risk monitoring and sometimes frequent trading to 
manage and hedge that risk. Again, the difficulty is in creating a clear 
standard to distinguish trading accounts from investment accounts vis-à-
vis the amount of trading activity (as a proxy for active versus passive 
investing). 
 
B. How Did Proprietary Trading Play a Role in the Financial Crisis of 
2008? 
Wall Street firms boomed in the mid-2000s, and Goldman Sachs 
provides an excellent case study of the importance of trading in the 
boom: “of the $6.7 billion [Goldman] earned before taxes [in 
2004]…75% came from trading and investments like its 15.5% stake in 
Archipelago.”70 If Wall Street in the mid-2000s was a car, trading was 
certainly its engine. But how much horsepower is too much horsepower? 
How far should firm-funded trading go? The following two examples of 
proprietary trading illustrate the irresponsible and risk-blind nature of the 
practice as it existed in the years leading up to the financial crisis. 
In an article appearing in Time magazine, former Lehman Brothers 
bond trader, Lawrence McDonald, recounts his experience of meeting a 
college-junior-level intern. During his winter break, this intern was 
trading derivatives for Lehman Brothers out of his $150 million book 
funded by the firm.
71
 Broker-dealers were apparently giving college 
students millions of dollars to engage in proprietary trading during their 
school breaks.
72
 The article goes on to list the proprietary trading losses 
of various firms, noting that Lehman lost $32 billion from proprietary 
trading and principal transactions.
73
 Lehman Brothers subsequently 
collapsed and is currently in bankruptcy.
74
 
                                                     
69 Id. 
70 Justin Fox, Goldman: We Run Wall Street, CNN MONEY (May 16, 2005), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/05/16/8260146/index.htm. 
71 Stephen Gamdel, Is Proprietary Trading Too Wild for Wall Street?, TIME (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1960565,00.html. 
72 While it is true that Lehman Brothers would not be considered a "banking entity" under the 
Volcker Rule definition, all of the surviving major Wall Street banks are now banking entities with 
deposit-taking institutions, and so the point is moot in the post-crash period. 
73 Gamdel, supra note 71.  
74 Investopedia Staff, Case Study: The Collapse of Lehman Brothers,INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.investopedia.com/ articles/economics/09/lehman-brothers-collapse.asp. 
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In addition to Lehman Brothers, several other banks faced serious 
losses due to proprietary trading. Merrill Lynch lost close to $20 billion 
from its proprietary collateralized debt obligation (CDO) bets.
75
 Its 
liquidity threatened and its future uncertain, Merrill Lynch was sold to 
Bank of America in September 2008 at a 40% discount to its share price 
in May of that year.
76
 Morgan Stanley lost $4 billion from proprietary 
trading in the fourth quarter of 2007 alone.
77
 A single Morgan Stanley 
trader, Howard Hubler, accounted for approximately $9 billion in the 
firm’s proprietary trading losses.78 One year later, Morgan Stanley’s 
application to become a Bank Holding Company was approved by the 
Federal Reserve Board amidst one of the worst months for the solvency 
of financial institutions in the history of modern banking.
79
 Citigroup lost 
nearly $15 billion on CDO bets.
80
 In February 2009, the U.S. government 
exchanged $25 billion in emergency bailout funds for a 36% equity stake 
in the company.
81
 
When all the dust settled, a report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office showed that “during [the] five quarters spanning 
the financial crisis…proprietary trading accounted for $15.8 billion in 
losses” at the six largest bank holding companies.82 Let that serve as a 
succinct summary of the role of proprietary trading in the financial crisis 
of 2008. 
 
C. Public Reaction to Proprietary Trading, the Financial Crisis, and the 
Volcker Rule 
It is not difficult to imagine that the actions of Wall Street traders, 
viewed by many as the cause of the 2008 financial crisis, angered the 
average American citizen. As commanded by subsection (b) of the 
Volcker Rule, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
conducted a comment period from the date of passage of the Dodd-Frank 
                                                     
75 Gamdel, supra note 71. 
76 Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC (Sept. 14, 
2008, 7:42 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319/Bank_of_America_to_Buy_Merrill_Lynch_for_50_Billion. 
77 Gamdel, supra note 71. 
78 Max Abelson, Howie Hubler of New Jersey: The Return of a Subprime Villain, THE N. Y. 
OBSERVER (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.observer.com/2010/wall-street/howie-hubler-new-jersey-
return-subprime-villain. 
79 Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Granted Federal Bank Holding Company 
Status by U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, (Sept. 21, 2008), 
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/6933.html. 
80 Gamdel, supra note 71. 
81 See U.S. Will Boost Stake in Citigroup to 36%, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2009, 1:01:58 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29421397/ns/business-consumer_news. But seeU.S. Treasury Plans 
to Sell Citigroup Common Shares in 2010, BLOOMBERG BUS. W. (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-29/u-s-treasury-plans-to-sell-citigroup-common-
shares-in-2010.html (The US government would go on to sell the securities for a significant profit 
from its original cost basis for acquisition of the shares, thus earning the taxpayer a tidy profit from 
the bailout). 
82 Scott Patterson & Victoria McGrane, The Multibillion-Dollar Leak, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204294504576615382298044922.html. 
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Act (July 25, 2010) until November 5, 2010.
83
 Many of the comments 
came from everyday American citizens who were outraged that Wall 
Street traders were able to take on risk from proprietary trading while 
their institutions held backstops from the federal government (i.e., the 
U.S. taxpayer).
84
 These individuals perhaps viewed a lax regulatory 
regime as an implicit governmental sanction for proprietary trading and 
financial risk-taking, and demanded the strict implementation of the 
Volcker Rule to prevent future occurrences of the same. For example, a 
commenter wrote, “institute the Volker [sic] rule and more you weasels. 
the banks have been allowed to enslave Americans for too long. stop 
[sic] it now do your regulatory jobs.pass [sic] and enforce laws that put 
the American people first, not banks and corporations. [T]homas Tague, 
voter.”85Such comments may seem firebrand, but they are rather 
representative (at least in sentiment if not in rhetoric), of the statements 
submitted to the FSOC’s request for comment on the Volcker Rule. 
Popular opinion—at least as reflected by the private citizen comments 
delivered to the FSOC—seems to view the Volcker Rule as an apt and 
necessary solution for the perceived problem of unchecked proprietary 
trading by traders at banking entities. 
Currently, the Volcker Rule comes under fire as a symbolic but 
ultimately meaningless piece of legislation, enacted solely to quell the 
sort of public outcry quoted above while actually doing little to prevent 
the activities and subsequent harm it purports to prevent.
86
 As discussed 
briefly above and in more depth below, the definition of “proprietary 
trading” is complex and contingent upon the definitions given to many 
other terms (e.g., “trading account,” “near term,” etc.). Depending on 
how the terms are defined, the Volcker Rule may have strong or weak 
effects with regards to preventing firms from making proprietary bets. 
While the U.S. constituency may believe that the Volcker Rule 
represents the government taking a strong step towards reining in the 
excesses of Wall Street power, it may be just another example of an 
“appease and deceive” strategy by lawmakers torn between the populist 
outcries of their constituents and the allure of Wall Street’s lobbyists. 
 
 
 
                                                     
83 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b) (2010). 
84 See infra note 85. 
85 Comment from Thomas Tague, public citizen member, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1372 (last visited Sept. 26, 
2011). Another commenter, Louis Spain, Jr., wrote, "If anything is done other than following the 
Volcker Rule, I would have to suspect that the people in your organization are domestic terrorists 
working secretly for the Taliban. We now know that the financial institutions in this country may as 
well be. Predatory, irresponsible and just plain incompetence don’t even begin to descrbe the 
behavior of the finanical instry [sic] in this country. Do not disappoint us on this!" Comment from 
Louis Spain, Jr., Personal, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1378 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
86 See, e.g., Kid Dynamite, More Thoughts on the Volcker Rule, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 5, 
2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/186862-more-thoughts-on-the-volcker-rule. 
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IV.   THE INTERPLAY OF PROPRIETARY TRADING AND PERMITTED 
ACTIVITIES 
A. What are “Permitted Activities?” 
Title 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) explicitly permits certain activities, 
despite the general prohibition on proprietary trading and investments in 
hedge funds and private equity funds.
87
 The relevant classes of permitted 
activities in the U.S. or to U.S. banks
88
 are as follows: 
 
 Trading in U.S. Government obligations, including obligations of the 
States, municipalities, and obligations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and Ginnie Mae.
89
 
 Trading “in connection with underwriting or market-making-related 
activities, to [an] extent …not to exceed the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”90 
 “Risk-mitigating hedging activities … related to individual or 
aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings of a banking entity 
that are designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking entity in 
connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other 
holdings.”91 
 Transactions on behalf of customers.92 
 Other trading activities that the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC 
determine
93
 would promote and protect the safety and soundness of 
the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.
94
 
The first point, (d)(1)(A), allows for attending to U.S. government 
obligations. This allowance seems logical because Congress does not 
want to impair the liquidity of markets on which the solvency of the U.S. 
government depends. Banking entities are therefore allowed to make 
proprietary trades (“prop trade”) in treasury bills, state bonds, muni 
bonds, Ginnie bonds (which are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
U.S. government),
95
 and Fannie and Freddie bonds (which are backed by 
the guarantee of the respective corporations).
96
 Mortgage-backed 
                                                     
87 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2010). 
88 § 1851(d)(1)(H) This section carves out proprietary trading conducted entirely outside the 
US by banking entities that are not organized within the US or controlled by any banking entity 
organized within the US. Query: Why would the Federal Reserve Board, SEC or CFTC have 
jurisdiction over the transaction anyhow? Perhaps because the transaction could involve securities 
registered under the ‘33 Act and so the SEC has jurisdiction over transactions in them? However, 
this does not mean that the Volcker Rule, which is US federal banking law, applies. 
89 § 1851(d)(1)(A). 
90 § 1851(d)(1)(B). 
91 § 1851(d)(1)(C). 
92 § 1851(d)(1)(D). 
93 § 1851(d)(1)(J) (pursuant to their rulemaking authority under subsection (b)(2)). 
94 § 1851(d)(1)(J). 
95 Full Faith and Credit, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/full-faith-
credit.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
96 Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ mortgagesecurities.htm 
(last modified July 23, 2010). 
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securities (MBS) issued by Ginnie, Fannie, and Freddie are also 
permissible because they are issued by the agencies themselves, not 
securitization trusts which may not fall into the (d)(1)(A) safe harbor.
97
 
The second point, (d)(1)(B), preserves the ability of banks to 
undertake securities trading activities with regards to their investment 
banking arms’ underwriting activities. Congress likely wanted to ensure 
that corporations’ access to the capital markets was not disrupted by 
regulation seeking to curb excessive risk-taking in proprietary trading. 
Since Congress likely did not seek to restrict securities trading related to 
IPOs and other underwriting activity, it seems appropriate that it is 
included in the (d)(1) safe harbor. 
In addition to allowing underwriting activities, (d)(1)(B) also permits 
trading in connection with market-making-related activities. Market-
making, however, is a bit trickier. Investopedia explains “making a 
market” as “[a]n action whereby a dealer stands by ready, willing and 
able to buy or sell a particular security at the quoted bid and ask price.”98 
To perform this task, a trader must have an inventory of the securities of 
the type for which he or she is making a market. Investopedia defines 
“Market Maker” as a broker-dealer firm that accepts the risk of holding a 
certain number of shares of a particular security in order to facilitate 
trading in that security. Each market maker competes for customer order 
flow by displaying buy and sell quotations for a guaranteed number of 
shares. Once an order is received, the market maker immediately sells 
from its own inventory or seeks an offsetting order. This process takes 
place in mere seconds.
99
 
If a trader anticipates demand for a security and is tasked with 
making a market in it, he or she will need to stock up on inventory to 
sell. This is fundamental market-making. However, a bank uses its own 
capital to acquire securities and place them in a trading account, thereby 
hoping to gain from the transaction. This is very close to the line 
demarcating permitted activity from proprietary trading, an issue 
addressed later in this Article.
100
 
Third, (d)(1)(C) allows traders to undertake risk-mitigating hedging 
on an individual or aggregate basis. Traders may therefore hedge 
individual securities transactions or entire portfolios of securities. 
Hedging plays an incredibly important role in trading because it allows 
traders to lock in profits and protect themselves from declines in the 
                                                     
97 See generally FANNIEMAE, GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES 1 
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.efanniemae.com/syndicated/documents/ 
mbs/mbspros/MF_October_1_2010.pdf (prospectus indicating that Fannie issues the MBS directly, 
not through a securitization trust); WELCOME TO THE GINNIE MAE INVESTORS’ HOME PAGE, 
GINNIEMAE.GOV, http://www.ginniemae.gov/investors/investors.asp?subTitle= 
Investorshttp://www.ginniemae.gov/investors/investors.asp?subTitle=Investorshttp://www.ginniema
e.gov/investors/investors.asp?subTitle=Investors (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
98 Make a Market, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/ 
makeamarket.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
99 Market Maker, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/ 
marketmaker.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
100 See infra text accompanying pp. 30-32. 
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prices of assets they hold in inventory. For instance, suppose that a trader 
holds a pile of illiquid agency mortgage bonds.
101
 Maybe he cannot sell 
them because there is not much of a market,
102
 or he does not want to sell 
them because he anticipates a customer order.
103
 A risk-mitigating 
hedging activity would be to sell TBAs,
104
 which would cancel out much 
of the interest rate risk of holding the bonds. 
The fourth point, (d)(1)(D), indicates that transactions on behalf of 
customers are permissible, and it also relates to the second point, 
(d)(1)(B). If the trader at a banking entity gets an order and does not have 
the securities in inventory, Congress wants him to be able to execute the 
order on the market for the customer. The trader is expressly enabled to 
do this under (d)(1)(D). 
The fifth point, (d)(1)(J), is a catch-all provision that gives the 
regulatory agencies power to determine whether they should permit other 
types of transactions. Provisions such as this are important because 
agencies can act much more swiftly than Congress. Should something in 
the Volcker Rule cause calamity in the financial markets, the government 
would need to act immediately. Thus, if a certain type of trade is 
necessary for financial stability but is proprietary in nature, and does not 
qualify under the permitted activity safe harbors (and thus is prohibited 
by the Volcker Rule) then the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC are 
given the power to allow that type of trade, and they would be able to 
grant the exception in a relatively short amount of time. 
Congress has also included a catch-all clause that allows the 
regulatory agencies to prohibit, under certain circumstances, any of the 
permitted activities under 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1), and delineates the 
reasons for when such a prohibition would be appropriate. 
Section1851(d)(2) states that the aforementioned “permitted activities” 
would not be permitted if they trigger any of the following conditions: 
 
 The transaction involves or results in a material conflict of interest 
between the banking entity and its clients, customers, or 
counterparties. Each agency has the authority, granted by subsection 
(b)(2) of 12 U.S.C. §1851, to define “material conflict of interest.”105 
 The transaction would expose the banking entity to high risk assets 
or involve the banking entity in high risk trading strategies. “High 
risk assets” and “high risk trading strategies” are also terms that shall 
be defined by the appropriate agencies, under the authority of 
subsection (b)(2) of 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
106
 
                                                     
101 Remember that Agency bonds are expressly permissible for proprietary trading. 
102 Congress wants the trader to hold the bonds because this encourages market liquidity for the 
particular asset. 
103 Congress wants traders to be able to make a market for clients with any security. 
104 To Be Announced. TBA, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ t/tba.asp (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2011) (“A term used to describe a forward mortgage-backed securities trade. Pass-
through securities issued by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae trade in the TBA market.”). 
105 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
106 § 1851(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2010).  
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 The transaction would pose a threat to the safety and soundness of 
the banking entity.
107
 
 The transaction would pose a threat to the financial stability of the 
United States.
108
 
 
It appears that the regulatory agencies have wide latitude in 
determining whether to permit or prohibit transactions, and to prescribe 
the lines by which one makes that determination. Making the Volcker 
Rule effective will require an active policing of transactions by the 
regulatory agencies to make sure that banking entities are not masking 
proprietary and impermissible transactions under banners of 
permissibility such as “market making” or “on behalf of a customer,” etc. 
 
B. How Can Banking Entities Disguise Proprietary Trading as a 
“Permitted Activity?” 
Banking entities may disguise impermissible proprietary trading as a 
“permitted activity” in a variety of ways. Entities may count the activity 
as market making or base it on customer flow. Indeed, Goldman Sachs 
has moved much of its proprietary trading staff to its Asset Management 
division and changed the name from Proprietary Trading to Client 
Trading.
109
 Suppose a trader deals in Treasury notes and bonds. A 
customer, hedge fund Alpha, comes to the trader and wants to buy $10 
million in Treasury long bonds. The trader believes that hedge funds 
Beta and Gamma, two other customers, will come to him with similar 
orders, so he buys $30 million in the bonds, fills Alpha’s order, and 
keeps $20 million in inventory. The price of the bonds rises and then 
Beta and Gamma come knocking, each with the same order for $10 
million. The trader sells out his inventory, and profits not just from the 
bid-offer spread (which are his profits from providing the liquidity), but 
also from the price rise in the bonds while held in inventory. The 
question arises: is this proprietary trading?  
An article in The Atlantic by Daniel Indiviglio poses a similar 
hypothetical.
110
 
 
This year, for example, several large insurance companies 
approached Goldman Sachs, looking to bet that the markets would 
not stay quiet. Goldman gladly took the other side of the trades, but 
                                                     
107 § 1851(d)(2)(A)(iii) (2010).  
108 § 1851(d)(2)(A)(iv) (2010).  
109 Courtney Comstock, Gasparino: Goldman Plans to Circumvent the Volcker Rule by 
Changing the Name from “Prop Trading” to “Client Trading,”BUSINESS INSIDER (Jul. 27, 2010, 
3:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/gasparino-goldman-plans-to-circumvent-the-volcker-
rule-by-changing-the-name-from-prop-trading-to-client-trading-2010-7. 
110 Daniel Indiviglio, Should We Be Outraged Banks Are Skirting the Volcker Rule?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 2010/08/should-
we-be-outraged-banks-are-skirting-the-volcker-rule/62114. 
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when the markets turned choppy in May, the firm was caught short 
and quickly lost $250 million. 
 The “other side” of the bet is what might have been considered 
prop trading. But in this case, Goldman was fulfilling the order of a 
client, so it can also be classified as a case of the bank acting as a 
market maker. The question, then, is whether we should be outraged 
if banks are still able to make bets for their own profit if it is in the 
context of making a market for a client.
111
 
 
The example above begs the question of whether this is proprietary 
trading. The answer probably lies somewhere in the definition of 
“reasonably expected near term demands of clients...”112 The trader’s 
activities, to fall within the safe harbor of (d)(1)(B), must only keep the 
bonds in inventory within the reasonably expected near-term demand of 
clients. However, the statute does not specify the length of “near term.” 
In reality, it depends on the liquidity of the market. For treasuries, it 
should be a short duration. For something highly illiquid, where the 
trader must act as principal, the asset should be allowed to remain on the 
trader’s books longer.  
The key challenges in regulating this aspect of the Volcker Rule and 
trading are: a) the amount of the asset that the trader should be allowed to 
keep as inventory, and b) the duration for which inventory should be 
allowed to be held. Goldman’s activity, falling more closely under 
(d)(1)(D)’s exception for customer-based orders, basically allows a 
banking entity to prop trade so long as someone else initiates the trade. A 
possible needed restriction here might require banking entities to not 
solicit another entity to “make a trade” with the bank that the bank 
wanted to make in the first place.  
Traders may also disguise proprietary trading by masking their 
positions as simply hedges of permitted trades, though in truth the 
‘hedge’ position is actually their real purpose. For instance, if a trader 
wants to pick up some derivatives, he can take on an interest rate swap as 
a hedge for a permitted position on Fannie or Freddie MBS. As long as 
the trader can show that he purchased the interest rates’ derivatives to 
offset his mortgage positions, then he can engage in mortgage arbitrage 
under (d)(1)(C). He only has to show that the IR swap position was “in 
connection with and related to” the MBS position and that he chose the 
IR swap position to reduce risk to the banking entity.
113
 The choice of a 
complicated “MBS hedged by IR swap” illustrates an important point: 
when considering this trade, the notional amounts are not very relevant. 
When hedging the MBS, simply buying a notional amount of the IR 
swap hedge does not make sense. Traders instead look to facets such as 
duration and convexity and hedge with respect to those. A trader could 
                                                     
111 Id. 
112 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (2010). 
113 § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2010). 
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demonstrate that an MBS position is hedged by an IR swap position 
because it is duration-neutral or convexity-neutral (and thus permissible 
under (d)(1)(C)), and yet still have an IR swap position that is notionally 
larger than the MBS position it is supposed to be hedging. 
 
V.     A DEFINITIONAL SOLUTION: DRAWING LINES IN A SANDSTORM 
 
Regulators use definitions to draw lines in the sand to create clear 
guidelines for regulated entities to follow. But in the complex 
environment of sales and trading, regulators have to draw lines in a 
sandstorm—a difficult and fruitless process. 
 
A. Trading Accounts Versus Investment Accounts 
First, the law needs a definition that will provide a clear distinction 
between trading and investment accounts. Making proprietary trading 
impermissible when conducted in trading accounts creates an incentive 
to shift proprietary operations over to investment accounts, if possible. A 
caveat here: how an account is defined—whether as a trading account or 
investment account—has consequences for the bank balance sheet 
because of the way in which it is accounted. Investment accounts, 
because of their long-term-hold strategy, are marked under book value 
accounting rules.
114
 Trading accounts, on the other hand, fall under mark-
to-market rules as per the standards in FASB Statement 157.
115
 So, while 
proprietary trading may be conducted out of investment accounts 
because it is only prohibited for trading accounts, these sorts of 
investments will appear differently in the banking entity’s financial 
statements and may pose a problem for moving certain activities from 
trading accounts to investment accounts. European and American 
accounting standards boards have been at odds about how to account for 
financial products in trading accounts, and this only complicates the 
debate.
116
 
Of greater concern in the trading account versus investment account 
debate is the nature of the investments made in each account, and the 
losses that result from them. If the definition of “trading account” turns 
on the “near term” requirement, it will conveniently overlook illiquid 
assets for which there is no constant market. If something trades every 
three months or so, would its purchase be booked to a trading or 
                                                     
114 Book Value, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bookvalue.asp. (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2011).  
115 FASB 157, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fasb_157.asp. (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2011) ("A Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement that requires all 
publicly-traded companies in the U.S. to classify their assets based on the certainty with which fair 
values can be calculated. This statement created three asset categories: Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. 
Level 1 assets are the easiest to value accurately based on standard market-based prices and Level 3 
are the most difficult."). 
116 Yalman Onaran, Fight over Fair Value in Global Finance Making Volcker Rue FASB 
Dissonance, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 21, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-
22/fight-over-fair-value-in-global-finance-making-volcker-rue-fasb-dissonance.html. 
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investment account? If it is booked to anything other than a trading 
account, it is permissible proprietary trading for purposes of the Volcker 
Rule. Thus, the Volcker Rule does not police, and perhaps incentivizes, 
undertaking principal investments in highly illiquid assets. This could be 
highly detrimental for the financial health of those firms.  
In response, David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital called out Lehman 
Brothers for marking up its highly illiquid real estate investments it had 
made on a proprietary basis.
117
 These investments were held in 
investment accounts, not trading accounts. Because of their illiquid 
nature they would still be permissible under the Volcker Rule. These 
same investments turned out to be overvalued on Lehman’s books and 
ultimately caused fatal losses for the firm.
118
 In light of that, “highly 
detrimental” is an understatement; perhaps “catastrophically detrimental” 
is more appropriate.  
Considering the complexity of distinguishing between different 
account-types and the potential for entities to circumvent the Volcker 
Rule’s trading-account exclusion, it would be prudent to place 
restrictions on proprietary trading in investment accounts as well. The 
Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC have authority to widen the definition 
of “trading account” under 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6), the provision which 
defines “trading account,” and includes “any such other accounts as the 
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by 
rule as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.”119 A truly meaningful 
restriction would be to remove the “account arbitrage” opportunity and 
make proprietary trading impermissible regardless of the type of account 
in which or for which it is done.  
B. “Engaging as a Principal,” Market-Making and Customer Flow 
The second definition required is that of “engaging as a principal.” 
While this appears in the definition of proprietary trading in subsection 
(h)(4), the term ties closely to the safe harbor for market-making 
activities delineated in subsection (d)(1)(B). Essentially, proprietary 
trading on a principal basis is impermissible unless it is part of market-
making activities to meet customer flow.
120
 A clear standard is needed to 
separate market-making from proprietary holding. That is, there needs to 
be a clear difference illustrated between holding inventory to make a 
market versus holding inventory to profit from an upward movement in 
the asset price. Defining market-making as matching inventory to 
customer order is not adequate, particularly with regard to volatile and/or 
illiquid markets where traders would need to anticipate customer orders 
                                                     
117 Hugo Lindgren, The Confidence Man, NEW YORK (Jun. 15, 2008), 
http://nymag.com/news/businessfinance/47844. 
118 See generallyANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (1st ed. 
2009).  
119 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6) (2010).  
120 § 1851(d)(1)(B) (2010). 
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and purchase inventory in advance in order to stabilize the market and 
provide liquidity. 
The Financial Stability Oversight Council study on the Volcker Rule 
has indicated that customer-flow metrics could be applicable for 
determining whether a trader has taken proprietary positions that do not 
correlate to appropriate customer flow.
121
 Many in the community have 
flagged the idea as an intelligent solution.
122
 While this is a promising 
idea, it bears mentioning that the agencies would need to collect data on 
customer flow for a meaningful number of trading-books on a 
meaningfully frequent basis to make the regulation relevant. The SEC, 
for instance, would need to review the flow metrics of enough traders’ 
books frequently enough that it would be able to catch instances of 
impermissible inventory-building where customer flow is lacking. To do 
so for every trading book, at every “banking entity,” every quarter, 
would produce a volume of data that the SEC may be unable to handle 
and rigorously process. It could, however, be done on an audit basis. 
Perhaps the best solution for this is to measure market liquidity and 
compare it to inventory turnover. The Financial Stability Oversight 
Committee suggests inventory metrics as part of their rigorous 
compliance regime.
123
 The study states,  
Inventory Turnover: This metric calculates the ratio of assets that 
are transacted each day to assets that are retained in inventory. The 
metric takes into account the need for market makers to hold 
inventory (volume of retained assets), but relates it to the asset’s 
observed customer demand (volume of transacted assets). 
 Impermissible proprietary trading seeks to profit from the 
appreciation of an asset. Retaining assets well in excess of customer 
demand may be an indicator that the trader is seeking to profit from 
the appreciation of inventory. Conversely, market makers with a near 
term goal of serving customers will acquire and sell (or, for some 
instruments, hedge) within as short a timeframe as possible in order 
to profit from the bid-ask spread.
124
 
 
This is likely to be the best solution to the problem. The more liquid 
a market is, the shorter the duration should be for which it is permissible 
                                                     
121FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 36 (Jan. 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf. "Customer-Flow 
Metrics: These metrics evaluate the volume of customer-initiated orders on a market making desk 
against those orders that are initiated by a trader for the purposes of building inventory or hedging. 
Significant trader-initiated, rather than customer-initiated, order volume could indicate that 
impermissible proprietary activity has occurred." Id. at 37.  
122 See, e.g., More on the Volcker Rule Study, ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPT (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:13 
AM), http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2011/01/more-on-volcker-rule-study.html. 
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for a trader to hold assets in connection with his “market-making” 
function. For highly liquid assets, like equities, liquidity is easy to 
measure: just look at the bid-ask spread. Something illiquid, like a 
tranche of the Countrywide Alternative Loan Trust, might trade once 
every few months or so. The equities trader should be required to “go 
flat,” or have a clean slate of inventory, in a shorter period than the trader 
in pieces of Countrywide’s Alt-A trust.  
Issues of LIFO versus FIFO accounting are clearly factors here 
which need to be sorted. LIFO accounting would make the most sense 
because FIFO accounting would require a trader to sell completely out of 
inventory in order to “go flat.” True market liquidity is a fairer measure 
than customer demand. However, it is more difficult to measure, and the 
volume of customer orders received by a desk may be a far more feasible 
proxy.  
One way to trick a system like the aforementioned, however, would 
be to “churn” one’s inventory. In a highly liquid market, a trader’s 
portfolio could have a high number of transactions that make it seem as 
though a lot of market-making activity is taking place. However, the 
trader could be masking a held proprietary position by making numerous 
small market-making transactions and thus raising the appearance that 
the book has “gone flat” when in fact a position is being held all along.  
 
C. Hedging 
Third, and finally, a definition of “in connection with and related to” 
is required, as the phrase exists in the hedging safe harbor in subsection 
(d)(1)(B). How does a trader demonstrate that a hedging position relates 
to a permissible trading position? What is the close connection or 
relation? Particularly, what will be the impact of the prohibition on 
trading desks taking positions in assets outside of the desk’s coverage? 
The financial law blog “Economics of Contempt” had a particularly good 
insight on this matter:  
 
If a bank wants to build up a proprietary position in equities, it’s not 
going to do it from the MBS desk; it’s going to do it from an equities 
desk. So there likely won’t be a deviation from the types of products 
used on the desk. And in fact, sometimes trading desks do actually 
use products for which they’re normally not approved as part of 
legitimate hedging strategies. For example, a fixed-income desk 
trying to hedge its largest counterparty exposure may have to resort 
to buying puts if, say, they can’t buy enough CDS protection to 
cover the counterparty exposure….125 
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As stated in the earlier example of hedging an MBS trade with an IR 
swap, normal Wall Street transaction hedges often occur outside of the 
product lines of the asset being hedged. Barring desks from reaching 
outside of their asset class would not prohibit proprietary trading as 
much as it would diminish the banking entity’s ability to hedge its 
positions. Regulators should want banks to hedge, as it mitigates risk of 
loss on outstanding positions.  
Prohibiting desks from going across product classes may also yield 
further costs because a “central hedging coordinator” would be 
necessary.
126
 For instance, an MBS trader who wanted to hedge an MBS 
position with an IR swap, but could not because of regulations restricting 
him from deviating from his asset class, would call the swap desk and 
ask them to take on a swap position on their book to hedge his MBS 
position held on his book. Eventually, it seems logical that some sort of a 
“coordination desk” would arise out of the confusion to arrange cross-
book hedges. The solution would be messy for banks and even messier 
for regulators trying to figure out what is going on inside banks. Asset-
class-based limitations seem like a bad idea for everyone involved.  
Solutions that attempt to identify particular hedges for particular 
transactions and bar all others would be counterproductive because they 
would infringe on a trader’s ability to be creative and innovative as 
products and product lines become more intricate and new sources of 
risk emerge. Definitions based on notional amounts are meaningless 
when considering hedges that exist to cover duration, convexity, or other 
factors for which the straight face value of the asset is irrelevant.  
In general, it seems that the definitional approach is unsuitable for 
regulating hedging because the nature of the market and its structure 
yield too many exceptions for any possible definition to be sensible and 
effective. Hedging is what makes traders, and their creativity, valuable. 
Limiting the tools available to traders in designing hedges strips away 
much of the value from sales and trading as business lines for banking 
entities. This subsequently reduces profit by reducing the number of 
profitable opportunities available to the bank. Banks will be forced to 
take on more risk to keep profit trading at prior levels, and shareholders 
of banking entities should be unhappy with this. Frankly, everyone 
should be unhappy with this.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The Volcker Rule seems to do more to create busywork for federal 
regulatory agencies than it does to meaningfully regulate the financial 
industry. The loopholes and gaps in its definitions are too broad. The 
banks and their lawyers have wide gaps through which to shuttle 
proprietary trading disguised as any number of permitted activities. One 
possible solution is to return to Glass-Stegall-style structure-based 
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regulation, cleaving proprietary trading firms from investor adviser 
firms.  
As Michael Lewis wrote in a Bloomberg column, there is a simpler 
solution for the problem the Volcker Rule sets out to solve: 
 
...ban any sort of position-taking at the giant publicly owned banks. 
To say, simply: You are no longer allowed to make bets in the same 
stocks and bonds that you are selling to investors. 
 If that means that Goldman Sachs is no longer allowed to make 
markets in corporate bonds, so be it. You can be Charles Schwab, 
and advise investors; or you can be Citadel, and run trading 
positions. But if you are Citadel you will be privately owned. And if 
you blow up your firm, you will blow up yourself in the bargain.
127
 
 
Lewis’s solution is brutal but not incomprehensible. It resonates with 
the McCain-Cantwell proposal to reinstate the Glass-Stegall prohibition 
on combinations of investment and commercial banks. As discussed 
above, however, there are significant pressures against reverting to such 
a system. Put simply, because of globalization, the financial services 
industry as we know it has crossed that Rubicon. Many of the large firms 
that function as both commercial and investment banks—the so-called 
“banking entities”—are too vital to the health of the U.S. and global 
economies to cleave them into separate parts: commercial bank from 
investment bank, or client-servicing firm from trading firm. The Volcker 
Rule represents Congress’s best effort in responding to populist anger at 
Wall Street banks’ risk taking while dealing with the inescapable reality 
that such entities have grown so powerful and vital that any strong-
worded regulation of them would perhaps do more harm than good (if it 
were able to get off the ground in Congress in the first place). The 
definitional suggestions presented in this article represent a proposed 
strategy in a game of roulette at the casino. Try as you might, don’t be 
surprised if the house ends up with all your money at the end of the 
night. 
 
VII.    EPILOGUE 
 
The Volcker Rule’s passage into law makes it perhaps unlikely that 
any further regulation of proprietary trading will occur. But if Congress 
were to eventually realize that the Volcker Rule’s separation of 
proprietary trading from marketmaking is functionally impossible to 
implement, then the following idea may serve as a better regulatory 
model.  
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The problem with the Volcker Rule is that it tries to regulate actions 
instead of structures. Structures are limited in nature and not easy to 
modify. Glass-Steagall’s separation of investment banking from 
commercial banking—its regulation of structures—drew broad and 
bright lines in flat and unshifting concrete. Trading actions are vague, 
numerous, and easy to modify. Defining them, much less regulating 
them, is like drawing lines in the sand of the Sahara Desert during a 
sandstorm with 80 mile per hour winds—a futile task. The sand changes 
shape before the lines are fully drawn, just as trades can be reconfigured 
and redefined before regulations are set into place. An action-based 
regulatory model, as stated above, will simply never work. 
A return to Glass-Steagall, as addressed in Part III, is unfeasible. 
However, structures do provide a reliable set of lines to draw. Because 
trading actions are too hard to define, it is not worthwhile to try to 
distinguish market-making from proprietary trading. The model proposed 
here would not distinguish between the actions taking place on a trading 
desk. All of the types of sales and trading activity that were legal before 
the passage of the Volcker Rule would still be legal. The key to this 
system, just as in the effective Glass-Steagall Act, lies in structure. Sales 
and trading need to be insulated from the deposit-taking institution 
owned by the bank holding company
128
 and thus the holding company’s 
access to the Discount Window. This is to prevent the moral hazard 
problem present when Bank Holding Companies can bail out their 
imploding trading desks with taxpayer money, accessed through the 
Discount Window. This is accomplished by taking the sales and trading 
units of each of the large bank-holding companies and forcing the 
holding companies to spin them off into wholly owned subsidiary 
corporations. The subsidiary corporation would be a bankruptcy-remote 
entity. In the event of the subsidiary corporation’s insolvency, its 
creditors would not be able to go after the assets or the Federal Reserve 
Discount Window facility of the parent holding company. The bank 
holding companies would provide the starting capital for its subsidiary 
corporation, and would receive all of the trading profits, less the amount 
used to pay its employees or to be held in reserve, as a dividend.  
The idea of the subsidiary’s “capital reserve” is important. Under this 
system, the parent company is only able to provide the subsidiary 
corporation with capital at its formation. After that time, the subsidiary 
corporation’s only capital flow is outward, from the subsidiary to the 
parent in the form of a dividend. If the subsidiary corporation needs 
additional funds, it has to rely on its reserve, or it may borrow against its 
assets from anyone except its parent-holding company or any company 
under its parent’s control. This is because when the subsidiary’s own 
capital can be replenished by taxpayer capital, then the firm, and thus the 
                                                     
128 Small commercial banks are held by large Bank Holding Companies as a means of gaining 
access to the Fed’s Discount Window facility. 
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traders, have no “skin in the game.” But there is a strong taxpayer 
incentive to force them to have skin in the game. 
A regulatory regime that permits proprietary trading (because it is 
too difficult not to) needs to make sure that if a subsidiary trading 
corporation goes bust, the traders and the bank are the ones that hurt the 
most. They need to be the ones to lose a proverbial finger. 
If the bank were free to capitalize as many subsidiary trading 
corporations as it wished to, it would have no desire to bail out a failing 
subsidiary when it could easily sponsor a new one the next day. The 
proposed regime would mandate that a bank-holding company only be 
allowed to have one subsidiary trading corporation under its control. This 
corporation would manage all of its sales and trading operations. In the 
event of that subsidiary’s insolvency, there would be a ten-year waiting 
period before the bank-holding company would be able to sponsor 
another one. This puts skin in the game. 
The effect of this is to say that a bank’s traders may engage in all 
manner of risky proprietary trading. However, if they blow up, the bank 
loses out on the extensive revenues gained from client-facing trades, the 
clients leave for rival banks, the bank suffers significant reputational 
harms, and the traders lose their jobs because the bank no longer has a 
sales and trading subsidiary. This creates the incentive for the banks to 
heavily police the activities of their traders, and for the traders to keep a 
watchful eye on their own risk. Both stand to suffer greatly otherwise.  
Regulation of this sort would be novel and perhaps of the sort to 
drive banks elsewhere. As stated before, the United States government 
has an interest in keeping banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
based in the U.S. It is unlikely that such a sweeping change to the 
regulation of sales and trading would be passed in the U.S. unilaterally 
for fear that banks would flee for Europe or Asia. However, the U.S. also 
occupies a position as world leader for legal innovation. Successful 
implementation of effective financial regulation would require the 
coordinated efforts of the U.S., the UK, and several other G-20 nations in 
order to ensure that no international regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
exist.
